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SUMMARY OF REPLY 
By requiring a significantly higher standard of medical 
evidence, the Ashcroft decision fails to recognize inherent 
differences between industrial and nonindustrial injury cases and 
subverts long standing case law, tradition and regulations which 
were designed to protect workers from inequities between parties 
which are created by the Workers' Compensation Act. By providing 
a means of circumventing this protection, the Ashcroft ruling 
causes such imbalance and inequity in the system as to threaten its 
constitutional viability. It should therefore be reversed. 
REPLY ARGUMENT 
The Appeals Court ruling in Ashcroft gravely alters 
established workers' compensation law and tradition to the extent 
of threatening the constitutional viability of the workers' 
compensation system. This reply is submitted because the appellees 
brief denies and attempts to obscure that fact. To clarify the true 
significance of the Ashcroft ruling, it is necessary to see its 
operation in context. 
POINT I 
THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT CREATES A LEGAL 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OPPOSING PARTIES WHICH IS VASTLY 
DIFFERENT FROM NONINDUSTRIAL INJURY CASES AND IS 
INHERENTLY INEQUITABLE 
First, it must be understood that the Workers' Compensation 
Act creates a legal relationship vastly different from that which 
exists in tort injury cases such as auto accidents. In an auto 
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accident injury the victim has medical group insurance or personal 
injury insurance on the auto which pay medical expenses and wages 
if the injury interrupts the victim's income. Beyond these 
resources there is a potential for significant recovery which makes 
it possible to get credit for needed medical and legal services. 
None of these resources are in any way dependant on or controlled 
by the potential defendant in the litigation. 
But the opposite is true in the workers' compensation case 
where the defendant has the natural advantage of being the employer 
of the plaintiff and usually of all the witnesses as well. 
Building on this naturally inequitable position, the Workers' 
Compensation Act creates further inequality by putting the 
defendant employer in control of all the means needed by the 
plaintiff to prosecute the claim. This is done by putting the 
employer in direct control over payment of medical and compensation 
benefits and by severely limiting the extent of benefits and 
attorney fees. That means the employer can rightfully or 
wrongfully terminate all medical payments and wage payments at 
least until a judgment requires otherwise. During the time before 
judgment, the defendant has the power to arbitrarily terminate the 
plaintiff's means of obtaining medical evidence needed to prosecute 
the claim. By further limiting benefit levels and attorney fees 
the Act destroys any other potential means by which the plaintiff 
might effectively prosecute his case. This Act puts the fox in 
full charge of the henhouse. 
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POINT II 
THE INEQUALITY CREATED BY THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT HAS 
BEEN REMEDIED BY TRADITION, CASE LAW AND REGULATION DESIGNED 
TO AMELIORATE THE WORKERS' DISADVANTAGED POSITION 
Until now, tradition, case law and regulations have attempted 
to level this uneven playing field created by the Workers' 
Compensation Act. By Supreme Court rule, workers are to be given 
all benefit of any doubt in granting benefits, Chandler v. 
Industrial Commission, 184 P. 1020 (Utah 1919). By tradition and 
Industrial Commission Rules, the worker has only been required to 
present sufficient evidence to raise a significant medical issue, 
not to prove his or her case, and the Industrial Commission would 
then be required by rule to hire and pay for a panel of doctors to 
evaluate and present the evidence, R568-1-9(A). And if the 
workers' treating doctor failed or refused to provide evidence 
sufficient to raise an issue for the medical panel, R568-1-9(B) 
provides means for the judge to request another doctor to provide 
the needed evidence at the expense of the Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund. In addition the commission has provided the Medical Records 
Summary form with which the worker may request a simple impairment 
rating without analysis by the doctor. This has traditionally been 
sufficient to raise a medical issue sufficient for a medical panel. 
POINT III 
THE ASHCROFT RULING EFFECTIVELY BYPASSES THE REMEDIAL 
SAFEGUARDS DESIGNED TO EQUALIZE THE PLAYING FIELD FOR WORKERS 
AND THEREBY REQUIRES WORKERS TO COMPETE WITH EMPLOYERS AS 
THOUGH THEY WERE ON EQUAL FOOTING 
Mr. Ashcroft presented two simple letters from his doctors 
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stating their conclusions on impairment. The defendant presented 
no medical evidence on this issue. The Appeals Court might have 
directed findings in favor of Mr. Ashcroft. But the defendant 
argued that the medical evaluation by the treating doctors was 
insufficient to support the finding, implying that he should 
present evidence of the type and quality which insurance companies 
obtain at a cost of $600 to $2000. The Industrial Commission went 
further and found these letters were insufficient even to raise an 
issue for purpose of getting the matter to a medical panel. This 
ruling was supported by the Appeals Court, which subsequently made 
this a trend by also upholding the Willardson case, in which the 
Industrial Commission found their own Medical Records Summary forms 
insufficient to raise an issue for a medical panel, Willardson v. 
Industrial Commission, 216 UAR 12 (Ut.App. 1993). 
The Appeals Court ruling in Ashcroft effectively subverts all 
of the tradition, case law and rules designed to equalize the legal 
playing field for injured workers and requires them to produce the 
same kind and quality of evidence only the employers have the means 
to present. 
CONCLUSIONS AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
A recent Texas case has declared that limiting plaintiff's 
attorney fees to 25% in workers' compensation cases without 
regulating defendant's attorney fees unconstitutionally denies due 
process and equal protection, Texas Workers' Compensation 
Commission v. Garcia, No. 04-91-00565-CV (August 11, 1993) . 
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Clearly, if the remedial protection designed to equalize the legal 
relationship between injured workers and employers in this state is 
allowed to be ignored or circumvented as the Appeals Court has 
upheld the Industrial Commission doing in this case, it will create 
such a state of inequity that it will not be long before a case 
must arise challenging the constitutional viability of the entire 
workers' compensation system. Under these circumstances surely 
there is sufficient deviation from the current law and practice to 
justify intervention by the Supreme Court under Rule 46 of 
Appellate Procedure. The Appellant therefore asks that this matter 
be accepted for review to restore a more balanced state to the 
workers' compensation adjudicative system. 
Bruce Wilson, ESQ, 
Attorney for Appellant 
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